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Bargaining And Economic Coercion - The Use And Effectiveness Of Sanctions - Valentin L. Krustev
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Valentin L. Krustev:
Bargaining And Economic Coercion - The Use And Effectiveness Of Sanctions - livre d'occasion

2000, ISBN: 9783836473101

ID: 9783836473101

International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them? This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them? This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military prepon-derance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments. Books, Political Science & Government~~General, Bargaining-And-Economic-Coercion-The-Use-And-Effectiveness-Of-Sanctions~~Valentin-L-Krustev, 999999999, Bargaining And Economic Coercion - The Use And Effectiveness Of Sanctions, Valentin L. Krustev, 3836473100, VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller e.K., , , , , VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller e.K.

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Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Valentin L. Krustev
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Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Livres de poche

2000, ISBN: 9783836473101

[ED: Taschenbuch], [PU: VDM Verlag], Neuware - International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military preponderance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments., DE, [SC: 0.00], Neuware, gewerbliches Angebot, FixedPrice, 164, [GW: 262g], offene Rechnung (Vorkasse vorbehalten), PayPal, Banküberweisung

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Bargaining and Economic Coercion - The Use and Effectiveness of Sanctions
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Bargaining and Economic Coercion - The Use and Effectiveness of Sanctions - Livres de poche

2008, ISBN: 9783836473101

[ED: Taschenbuch / Paperback], [PU: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller], International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them? This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military preponderance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments., [SC: 0.00], Neuware, gewerbliches Angebot, 22 cm, [GW: 225g]

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Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Valentin L. Krustev
Livre non disponible
(*)
Valentin L. Krustev:
Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Livres de poche

2000, ISBN: 9783836473101

[ED: Taschenbuch], [PU: VDM Verlag], Neuware - International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military preponderance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments., [SC: 0.00], Neuware, gewerbliches Angebot, FixedPrice, [GW: 262g]

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Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Valentin L. Krustev
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Valentin L. Krustev:
Bargaining and Economic Coercion - nouveau livre

2000, ISBN: 9783836473101

ID: 6acd490699613c17b357d6b9f173182a

International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them? This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism.Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes.The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military preponderance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments. Bücher / Sozialwissenschaften, Recht & Wirtschaft / Politikwissenschaft

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Détails sur le livre

Informations détaillées sur le livre - Bargaining and Economic Coercion


EAN (ISBN-13): 9783836473101
ISBN (ISBN-10): 3836473100
Version reliée
Livre de poche
Date de parution: 2008
Editeur: VDM Verlag
164 Pages
Poids: 0,261 kg
Langue: eng/Englisch

Livre dans la base de données depuis 22.01.2008 03:25:13
Livre trouvé récemment le 15.09.2017 18:45:45
ISBN/EAN: 3836473100

ISBN - Autres types d'écriture:
3-8364-7310-0, 978-3-8364-7310-1


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